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1 Introduction 
Federated single sign-on (SSO) has focused on providing authentication and access control for websites 
accessed directly by the user’s browser. For example, logging in to a library resource, or accessing a virtual 
learning environment (VLE). The user’s IdP passes information to the service he/she wishes to access. This 
assertion is usually strictly limited to being valid only on the website it was created for. 
However, in distributed environments it is often necessary for a remote service to access other services on 
behalf of a user, or for a software agent to act on behalf of the user. In this case, it is necessary to securely 
delegate the user’s “rights” from the website he/she originally accessed to a wide variety of other 
applications, such as mobile applications, intranet services and HPC clusters. 
The oldest form of credential delegation is to store and reuse the user’s login password. This is neither 
possible nor safe in a distributed environment. Current delegation credentials include signed assertions, 
session tickets, “tokens” of various types, and proxy certificates. 
2 Delegation 
This document covers requirements for delegation, to aid (1) the selection of the optimal technology for 
implementing delegation, and (2) to deploy and operate the technology. While the examples use specific 
technologies, they should also illustrate the situations where delegation is useful. 
2.1 Types of Delegation 
The term “delegation” is sometimes used to cover slightly different scenarios: 
A. Delegation of rights to another person. Combined with RBAC, this becomes entirely an authorisation 
question and is outside the scope of this document.  The delegatee is typically a person, but could also 
be a service. 
B. Delegation of access to another person - a client, service, or person requests and obtains the right 
from the “owner” of a resource to access the resource, as in OAuth2. The token is typically issued for 
a limited time and purpose. 
C. Credential delegation (sometimes called impersonation). The most primitive example is copying the 
username/password as mentioned above; more useful examples include Kerberos proxiable tickets 
(RFC1510) and GSI (RFC3820): a remote service (typically a host/service, not a person) obtains a full or 
limited credential with which it can act on behalf of the user. 
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The first point (type A) is out of scope for this document (it will be covered in AARC2); the more widely used 
second and third points are covered here. 
2.2 Delegation Features 
This section summarises feature-related points to consider when selecting technology/implementations for 
delegation (beyond the usual questions of maturity of technology, interoperation of implementations, etc.) 
The discussion considers a scenario in which a delegatee acts on behalf of a delegator (and by assumption is 
authorised by the delegator), and a token is issued to the delegatee by some authority to enable it to do so. 
1. Can the participants (delegator, delegatee) be humans/automated? 
a. For the authentication of human participants, is federated identity management (FIM) supported? 
(Note that the resource, to which access is delegated, is usually non-human.) 
2. How does the delegation integrate with existing authorisation? 
3. How is the token validated? 
a. By the delegatee? 
b. By the resource accessed by the delegatee? 
c. Can the token be revoked, such that validation by the resource will fail? 
4. Is the technology web-based, or does it support non-web access? 
a. If web-based, does it work with basic HTTP clients such as curl (plus perhaps some other standard 
components, such as XML or JSON parsers)? Or does it require that the client be a browser (needs 
JavaScript, user intervention)? 
b. If it supports non-web access, does it also work with web servers/clients? 
5. Does it support onward delegation (from the delegatee to a second delegatee)? 
a. With the originating user’s permission? 
b. Without? 
6. Can the scope of the delegated credential be limited? Options include: 
a. Limited time (possibly pre-dated, valid in the future). 
b. Locked to a particular delegate. 
c. Not further proxiable. 
d. Limited number of uses. 
e. Limited set of activities it can be used for. 
7. Is the delegatee’s use of the delegated token logged/audited? 
8. How is the delegated credential stored and protected by the delegatee? 
Guidelines for credential delegation  
 
© GÉANT on behalf of the AARC project. 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Horizon2020 Programme under Grant 
Agreement No. 653965 (AARC). 
5 
3 Examples 
3.1 Example 1 (Type A) 
Alice is responsible for a VO, so has an “admin” role which gives her rights to define and modify attributes for 
members of the VO. However, Alice is going on holiday, so she temporarily assigns the admin role to Bob: 
during this holiday period, Bob can manage members’ attributes just like Alice except he cannot delegate the 
admin right further. At the end of Alice’s holiday, Bob’s admin assignment times out and he reverts to a 
normal member role. 
Note that this is different from Alice nominating Bob as her deputy (or of Bob impersonating Alice) in three 
respects: first, the delegation of authority is time limited, and secondly, Bob’s rights are restricted to the 
delegated role; he cannot do everything that Alice can do.  Finally, Bob cannot delegate the right further. 
The technologies behind this are out of scope for AARC1 and will be covered in more detail in AARC2. 
3.2 Example 2 - OAuth2/OIDC (Type B) 
The “classic” OAuth2 delegation scenario is a user delegating rights to a printer to access their photos - this is 
described in the introduction to RFC 6749 [OAUTH2]. In this section, we show two extensions of delegation 
based on OAuth2 and/or OIDC [OIDC]. 
3.2.1 Example 2a - Delegation for SAML authentication (Type B): 
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This example is based on a SAML-based authentication-infrastructure and focuses on a use-case where a 
client (“Web Service Client or Portal”) wants to access another web-service (“OAuth2 Resource Server (RS)”) 
on behalf of the user. There are two problems when doing this in SAML: a) the delegation step is difficult to 
realise with pure SAML (the assertion would have to be securely redirected to the web-service, which is not a 
common use-case) and b) the web-service might be REST-based. Therefore, the SAML-based infrastructure is 
combined with the OAuth2 authorization code flow to handle delegation. Once the client wants to access the 
web-service it issues an Authorization Request (step 2). A SAML SP protects the Authorization Endpoint and 
handles authentication (steps 3-5). Note that this is the only place where SAML-based communication takes 
place. After that the usual OAuth2 authorization code flow continues (steps 6-9) and finally the client can 
access the web-service with the access token (steps 10-12). Note that the client is mainly a OAuth2 client in 
this scenario but can also be a SAML SP at the same time.  
The EUDAT B2ACCESS, CIlogon, and RCauth services work the same way: services can internally (within the 
relying party infrastructure) use OAuth for delegation, with the user authenticated through (external) SAML 
IdPs. See also example 3b. 
See also [RFC7522]. 
3.3 Example 2b - INDIGO use of OIDC (Type B) 
(This example requires some knowledge of the OAuth2 protocol) 
OpenID Connect is used for the authentication and OAuth2 for authorization within INDIGO. The authorization 
using OAuth2.0 has two major drawbacks: 
1. The OAuth2.0 specification does not specify a way to redelegate (and limit) access to a third instance. 
2. OAuth2.0 does not specify a flow to gain long lived access for a downstream service. 
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The first issue results in the access token issued for service A to be unusable for service B, which from a 
security point of view is usually desirable. To put it differently, if service B is allowed to use the token directly, 
it will have the same permissions as service A, which is not a good approach from the security point of view.  
The question is, what if service A needs to delegate its access to service B so that the service B can perform 
only  a limited set of tasks on the behalf of the user? 
The second issue is slightly more complicated than the first one. This time service B needs a long-lived refresh 
token, instead of an access token which is bound to the service (client), in this example A. The service B needs 
the refresh token to perform tasks longer than the lifetime of the access token, like performing long running 
jobs on behalf of the user. 
The INDIGO DataCloud IAM (Identity and Access Management) works around these limitations by 
implementing the needed parts of the ‘OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange’ [OAUTH2-TE].  This proposal extends 
OAuth 2.0 to enable both clients and delegated clients to request and obtain security tokens from 
authorization servers (ASs).  The specification defines a new grant type for a token exchange request and the 
associated specific parameters for such a request to be submitted to the token endpoint. 
Upon successful authentication of the OAuth client (delegator) to the AS (IAM) with one token, a new token is 
issued to the client, which can be forwarded to the delegatee. The new token might be an access token that is 
more narrowly scoped for the resource, or it could be an entirely different kind of token, including, but not 
limited to, bearer or JSON web token (JWT). 
If the requested and granted scope includes the ‘offline’ scope, the resource will be able to request a long-
lived refresh token using the freshly minted token. The refresh token will, following the OAuth2.0 
specification, be bound to that specific client (delegatee). 
The implementation of this feature enables the INDIGO architecture to delegate access and refresh token in a 
controllable manner through IAM. 
3.4 Example 3a - GSI proxies 
In grid job submission, the users of the grid are authenticated using X.509 certificates.  The job runs on a 
worker node but needs to access resources on behalf of a user, e.g. a storage element.  The delegation is done 
with GSI proxies [RFC3820] that is, short-lived certificates that are issued and signed with the user’s personal 
certificate or with other GSI proxies. This is normally not permitted, but GSI allows for this provided restricted 
naming conventions are followed (i.e. users issue delegated certificates only in their own name, not in other 
users’ names.) 
Multi-step delegation appears naturally in this scenario by creating new GSI proxies from existing GSI proxies, 
thus forming a proxy certificate chain. Such multi-step delegations are necessary in for example job-
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submission, where the job has to go through a number of services before landing on a worker node, or for so-
called third-party data transfers, where large data files are transferred directly between two storage elements 
on behalf of the user. 
GSI certificates are used not just to delegate, but also to enable use of credential stores (such as the MyProxy 
server), and to “decorate” certificates with authorisation attributes, or with other attributes which limit the 
scope, including limiting the number of onward delegations. In case of abuse, the impact can be mitigated by 
revoking the end-entity certificate, which will result in the verification of the proxy chain to fail.  
In all cases, the general convention is that the private key does not move (see RFC 3820 section 2.7 and the 
MyProxy protocol [MYPROXY] section 2.4); thus, a service which wishes to obtain a delegated credential from 
the user generates a key pair and a request, and sends the request to the delegator (which may form part of 
the chain, with the user themselves being the earliest delegator). 
Questions may arise when a longer delegated chain arrives at a service, with more than one of the 
delegated/delegating certificates “decorated” with authorisation extensions. These issues were investigated 
by the OGF VOMSPROC and IDEL working groups. 
3.5 Example 3b - Combined use of X.509 and OIDC 
In the portal delegation scenario of the US-based CIlogon service, the flow as described in example 2a is used 
to get a user’s end-entity certificate onto a web portal (acting as OIDC client) by putting an online CA behind 
an OIDC protected resource (acting as OIDC Resource Server). Logging in at the Authorization Server is 
typically done using a SAML SSO flow. The OIDC access token is used by the client to obtain the certificate 
from the online CA. 
This scenario has been further extended and adapted to the European infrastructure and policy requirements 
and let to the development of the RCauth.eu service. In the latter scenario, a full web-flow becomes feasible, 
where a Science Gateway can easily obtain a short-lived proxy certificate which can be used in all the use-
cases where GSI certificates are used, such as job-submission on grid-infrastructure, accessing storage 
elements etc., but in a way that they remain completely hidden for the end-user. 
4 Guidelines for Implementing Delegation 
For integrator/developer/architect, faced with the need to delegate within their infrastructure, a decision 
needs to be made regarding the technologies to use. As can be gleaned from the examples, different projects 
solve the same problem in different ways, either because they have to integrate with different existing 
infrastructures or because they require different features. Suggested steps are: 
1. Decide which features you need (see section on features) 
2. Select technology, preferring standards-based and interoperable, then mature. 
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3. Look up best practices for running it and implement them 
4. Check the risks. 
5. Ask for help from the experts 
The key point is to select the technology based on the features required; once the selection has been made, 
the technology and the features (including the features not supported by the technology) may give rise to 
specific risks, which should be assessed. 
4.1 Example of Feature Selection 
The following table illustrates technology selection based on features, focusing on three very common and 
widely supported technologies: GSI proxies, OIDC/OAuth2 and Kerberos. There are other technologies with 
similar or different feature sets; in particular, the editorial decision has been taken to not cover SAML ECP1 
[SAML-ECP-1], Macaroons [MACAR], iRODS tickets [IRODS], Dynafed [DYNAF], and other relevant but less 
widely used technologies. 
Feature Required GSI proxies OIDC/OAuth2 Kerberos 
Human/automated participants Both Limited2 Both 
Integration with existing 
authorisation 
Fully integrated with VOMS Own authorisation Via LDAP/Active 
Directory 
Token validated? Verify digital signature of the 
chain and check for 
revocation 
Call-out to AS Digital signature 
Web/non-web (primarily 
delegatee/resource)? 
Mainly non-web Mainly web Both 
                                                           
1 The delegation part of the specification was not included in the main Shibboleth implementation. 
2 The “Resource Owner” (cf. RFC 6749) generally has to be human (i.e. the “End-User” of [OIDC-GUIDE]), with 
a browser; however, see also Section Error! Reference source not found. Error! Reference source not found.. 
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Onward delegation? Yes, chained (RFC 3820) No, but see [AARC-
JRA1.4D] for discussion 
Yes, at least 
within realm 
Delegation can be restricted (in 
the sense of Feature 6) 
Partly Depends on token type Partly 
Logged/audited use? Yes Yes (in AS) No 
How is it protected? Filesystem Filesystem Filesystem 
Revocation Yes Implementation 
dependent 
No 






Admittedly, this table does not quite do justice to the discussion, and only covers the high-level questions; but 
hopefully it should illustrate the selection process for different delegation technologies, and it could point the 
way to further work on delegation, if needed. 
 
5 Risks associated with delegations 
The table below summarises several general risks associated with delegation. It does not cover the 
technology-specific risks. (For example, if OAuth is used with bearer tokens (RFC 6750), there is a risk that a 
stolen token could be misused, as it intentionally does not support Feature 6.b. (Locked to a particular 
delegate), but it thus allows delegation to unregistered clients. If the use of the token (through the validation) 
is logged by the Authorisation Server (Feature 7), it could help mitigate this risk.) 
 Description Type Owner Mitigation 
0 Delegation is not supported by 
protocol or infrastructure 
Proto Infrastructure See earlier subsections of this section 
and the guidelines on token 
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translation services. 
1 Delegated credential is compromised Op Infrastructure Use revocable and/or short-lived 
credentials. 
Adopt best practices for operational 
security (see [SIRTFI-1] sections OS, 
IR, and PR.) 
2 Delegated credential used for non-
user-approved activities, by being too 
widely applicable, or by being 
forwarded/delegated without the 
user’s consent 
Op User Credentials with limited use/ 
purpose/locality and/or which are 
revocable. 
Auditable (user-visible) use of 
delegated credential. 
3 Delegated credential is delegated 
further (without authorisation) 
Op User Special case of Risk 2 (or Risk 1, 
depending on point of view). See 
[AARC-JRA1.4D]. 
4 Lack of clarity in interpretation of 
rights of delegated credentials, 
particularly credentials delegated 
multiple times (combining restrictions) 
Tech, 
Policy 
Infrastructure For example, see the work by the 
OGF VOMS attribute PROCessing 
working group [VOMS-PROC] on 
VOMS Attribute Certificate Parsing 
Rules for Chained Identity 
Credentials. 
5 Delegated credential not capable of 
inheriting same (or selected) 
authorisations as user credential 
Tech User Bugfix – may need changes to SP to 
support delegated credential 
6 User cannot fine-tune limits on 
delegated credential so sets the most 




Infrastructure Test with real users 
7 Delegations don’t work (or features Tech User Needs research 
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are lost) in a federated environment 




[AARC-JRA1.4D] Guidelines for credential delegation 
https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/AARC-JRA1.4D.pdf 
[DYNAF] Dynafed – The Dynamic Federation Project web page 
http://lcgdm.web.cern.ch/dynafed-dynamic-federation-project 
[IRODS] iRODS Docs – Tickets (Guest Access) 
https://docs.irods.org/4.2.0/system_overview/users_and_permissions/#tickets-guest-access/ 
[MACAR] A. Birgisson et al., Macaroons: Cookies with Contextual Caveats for Decentralized 
Authorization in the Cloud, Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2014 
https://www.internetsociety.org/doc/macaroons-cookies-contextual-caveats-decentralized-
authorization-cloud/ 
[MYPROXY] The MyProxy Protocol 
http://grid.ncsa.illinois.edu/myproxy/protocol/  
[OAUTH2] The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749 
[OAUTH2-TE] OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (Draft) 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-08 
[OIDC] OpenID Connect 
http://openid.net/connect/  
[OIDC-GUIDE] OpenID Connect Basic Client Implementer’s Guide 1.0 – draft 37 
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-basic-1_0.html 
[RFC3820] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate Profile 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3820  
[RFC7522] Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication 
and Authorization Grants 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7522  
[SAML-ECP-1] Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0, OASIS, March 2005 
http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ 
[SIRTFI-1] T. Barton et al., A Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity (Sirtfi) 
https://refeds.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Sirtfi-1.0.pdf 
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7 Glossary 
ECP Enhanced Client Protocol 
FIM Federated Identity Management 
GSI Grid Security Infrastructure 
JSON JavaScript Object Notation (RFC 7519) 
OIDC OpenID Connect 
RBAC Role-Based Access Control 
REST REpresentational State Transfer (web services design principle) 
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language 
VLE Virtual Learning Environment 
VO Virtual Organization 
 
